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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we explain how the intentional objects of our mental states 
can be represented by the intensional objects of conceptual realism. We 
first briefly examine and show how Brentano’s actualist theory of 
judgment and his notion of an immanent object have a clear and natural 
representation in our conceptualist logic of names. We then briefly 
critically examine Meinong’s theory of objects before turning finally to 
our own representation of intentional objects in terms of the intensional 
objects of conceptual realism. We conclude by explaining why 
existence-entailing concepts are so basic to our commonsense 
framework and how these concepts and their intensions can be used to 
model Meinong’s ontology.  
According to Franz Brentano the content [Inhalt] of a mental state “contains an 
immanent objectivity,” which Brentano described as the “intentional 
inexistence” of an object.1 Intentional inexistence is a scholastic notion, which 
means existence in the mental act itself. Brentano did not intend to take an 
immanent objectivity to be the independent existence (or being) of an 
intentional object, in other words, but just the opposite: an immanent object 
has no being outside of the mental act in which it occurs, which means that it is 
a psychological and not a semantic content that “contains” such an object. 
Brentano was a strict actualist, moreover: nothing exists or has any other mode 
of being other than the actual concrete objects that exist at the time that the 
mental act occurs.2 
 
† Indiana University. Bloomington, IN, USA. 
1 Brentano 1874a, p. 50. 
2 We assume that Brentano allowed for reference to past objects that no longer exist, however, 
because unlike future objects their individuation is now settled. This is a minor qualification of his 
actualism. 
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That is not how his student, Alexius Meinong, understood the situation in 
his “Theory of Objects”. For Meinong, an intentional object is not an 
immanent object of a judgment but rather it is a constituent of the “Objective” 
(which is something like a state of affairs) toward which the content of that 
judgment is directed. As a constituent of an Objective an intentional object is 
said to be a “pure object” that is independent of that mental act, or even of the 
possibility of there being such a mental act. The objects in Meinong’s ontology 
include far more than the concrete objects that exist at the time of a mental act; 
in particular, they include impossible as well as merely possible objects, and 
also Objectives and the properties and relations that might be constituents or 
components of those Objectives. Brentano’s strict actualism is too restrictive 
an ontology, but Meinong went much too far in his ontology of Objectives with 
objects that are “outside of being” (ausserseiend). 
In what follows we will explain how the intentional (with a t) objects of our 
mental acts can be represented by the intensional (with an s) objects that are 
projected in conceptual realism as the semantic contents of the concepts 
exercised in those acts. These intensional objects do not exist as part of our 
mental acts, i.e., they do not have “intentional inexistence,” but they also do 
not exist independently of language, culture and consciousness in general. 
Conceptual realism is a rich but consistent framework that goes well beyond 
Brentano’s actualism, but also well short of Meinong’s theory of objects. We 
have described this framework in detail elsewhere and will give only enough of 
a brief sketch of it here to serve our present purpose.3 In doing so we will 
briefly examine and formally represent Brentano’s theory of judgments and 
then see how Meinong’s intentional objects, when appropriately relativized, 
can be represented in this framework without adopting his ontology of objects 
that are “outside of being” . 
1.Conceptualism and the Logic of Names. 
 
Conceptualism is based on a theory of our speech and mental acts, where a 
speech act is a mental act that is expressed verbally. These acts are the result of 
our exercising concepts as cognitive capacities, including especially referential 
 
3 The logical core of the framework is a second-order logic with nominalized predicates as abstract 
singular terms called 

HST . For a more detailed account of conceptual realism than we will give 
here, see Cocchiarella 1996, and Cocchiarella 2007. 
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and predicable concepts. Concepts are what underlie thought and our capacity 
for language in general, and, in particular, concepts as cognitive capacities are 
what underlie our rule-following abilities in the use of language, including 
especially our use of referential and predicable expressions. Referential 
concepts are the capacities by which we purport to refer to objects, and 
predicable concepts are the capacities by which we characterize those objects. 
In other words, referential concepts are what underlie the intentionality and 
directedness of our speech and mental acts, which they do by informing those 
acts with a referential nature. Predicable concepts inform those acts with a 
predicable nature. 
A judgment, in particular, is the result of jointly exercising a referential and 
a predicable concept. This is not the traditional medieval or Port Royal view of 
judgment as a combining or separating of concepts (as mental images), 
however. As cognitive capacities concepts are not images or any other sort of 
mental phenomena in the sense of particular mental occurrences, and they 
cannot be combined or separated in the medieval or Port Royal sense. In fact, 
concepts cannot be separated in any sense, and their “combination” or joint 
exercise is really a form of mutual saturation. In other words, as cognitive 
capacities, concepts have an unsaturated nature, a nature which, when 
exercised as capacities, results in particular mental acts (events). As 
unsaturated capacities, moreover, referential and predicable concepts have 
complementary structures that when exercised together result in a speech or 
mental act in just the way that quantifiers (or noun) phrases and predicate (or 
verb) expressions have complementary structures that complement each other 
in the construction of declarative sentences or propositional formulas. 
The logical framework for conceptualism, which is independent of its 
development into the fuller framework of conceptual realism, consists of a 
logic of names, relative to which, as it turns out, Leśniewski’s system of 
ontology (which he also called a logic of names) can be reduced (and 
reinterpreted in a more natural way).4 Here by names we mean common as well 
as proper names, i.e., proper and common nouns, including mass nouns as well 
as count nouns, and also gerunds in their role as verbal nouns. 
We use the letters A , B , and C  to represent names in formulas (though 
informally we will also use proper and common names spelled out in italics). 
Our conceptualist logic of names can be described in terms of a free first-order 
 
4See Cocchiarella 2001, and Cocchiarella 2007, chapter 10. 
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logic with identity, but extended to include indexed quantifiers affixed to 
names, as, e.g., with the expressions )( xHorse  and )( yMan , which are 
read as ‘every horse’ and ‘some man’, or also simply as ‘a man’.5 Complex 
names, such as ‘man who is over six-feet tall’ or ‘car that has four wheel-drive’, 
i.e., names with a qualifying relative clause, are represented as OverMan/ -
six - )(xfeet  and HasCar/ - 4 -Wheel - )(yDrive , where the forward 
slash marks the beginning of the relative clause.6 We rephrase attributive 
adjectives, as in ‘round square’, as predicative adjectives in a relative clause, as 
e.g., ‘square that is round’. Attributive adjectives such as ‘alleged’ in ‘alleged 
thief’ are really operators, as in ‘person who is alleged to be a thief’, where 
‘alleged’ would be symbolized as the operator ‘it is alleged that’.7 
The indexed quantifier   is affixed to a proper name, as e.g. 
)( xSocrates , when we want to represent a use of that name that is with 
existential presupposition, i.e., with the presupposition that the name 
denotes.8 The quantifier   is affixed to a proper name, as e.g. 
)( yPegasus , when we want to represent a use of the name ‘Pegasus’ that is 
without existential presupposition. Definite descriptions, which function in 
both natural language and in our logic the same way that quantifier phrases do, 
can also be used with and without existential presupposition. Our treatment of 
definite descriptions is especially appropriate, moreover, because of the way 
 
5 We do not read   as ‘there exists’ in this logic, but as ‘there is’. For ‘there exists’ we would use 
e , which can either be defined in terms of the predicate !E  for existence or taken as an additional 
primitive quantifier. We allow for things that do not exist, e.g., past objects, and, when the logic is 
later extended, future and possible objects, and abstract objects as well. All of these objects will be 
values of the bound object variables in conceptual realism. For Brentano’s ontology, we assume that 
there are past objects that do not now exist. That is why )(!)( xEx   is both meaningful and true 
in Brentano’s ontology. This is only a minor extension of his strict actualism. 
6 The following theorem schemas indicate how relative clauses are understood in this logic: 
  
                      ],)()[())(/( xxFxAxxFxA    
 ].)()[())(/( xxFxAxxFxA    
7 Other attributive adjectives such as ‘big’ and ‘small’, as in ‘big mouse’ and ‘small elephant’ have an 
analysis more involved than as a simple predicate adjectives; but we will not go into that analysis here. 
8 Proper names differ from common names in that a proper name denotes at most one object (if any) 
and the same object in any possible world in which that object exists. In other words, the following 
meaning postulate is assumed to hold for each proper name A  that is introduced into the system: 
)]).=)(()(![)=)(()(( yxyAxExyyAxA    
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we interpret our speech and mental acts as the joint exercise of a referential and 
a predicable concept, which means that all referential expressions, including 
definite descriptions, are to be represented in this logic by quantifier phrases. 
We use the quantifier 1  to represent the use of a definite description that is 
with existential presupposition, as in 
)())()(/(( 1 xItalianxEyedBluexTallxMan   
for an assertion of ‘The tall blue-eyed man is Italian’ in a context where there is 
such a unique individual. The axiom schema for the quantifier 1  is:  
)].()=)()[(()()( 1 xFxyyAxAxFxA   
We use the dual quantifier expression 1  for the use of a definite description 
that is without existential presupposition, as in ‘The student who writes the 
best essay will receive a grade of A’ in a context in which two or more students 
might write the best essays equally well. The axiom scema for 1  is: 
)].()=)()[(()()( 1 xFxyyAxAxFxA   
2. Brentano’s Theory of Judgment 
There are three types of intentionality (or “ways of being conscious of an 
object”) according to Brentano. The primary way is by presentation 
(Vorstellung), by which was meant an act in which “something”, an immanent 
objectivity, is presented. Presentations are the primary form of intentionality, 
according to Brentano, because they are the basis for all other mental 
phenomena, including judgments and desires, as well as every kind of 
emotional mental act.9 In an act of loving or hating, for example, one takes an 
emotional stand pro- or con toward the content of a presentation. An 
emotional state of mind is the second of the three types of intentionality. 
Judgments (Urteile) are the third type of intentionality, where, by a 
judgment, Brentano meant an act of affirming or denying the content of a 
presentation.10 The content of a judgment, in other words, is of the same type 
of immanent objectivity as the content of a presentation, or of an emotional 
 
9Brentano 1874a, p. 42. 
10Brentano 1874b, p. 63. 
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state. The only difference is that with a judgment one takes a stand of affirming 
or denying the content of a presentation. That is why Brentano also rejected 
the traditional medieval view of judgment as a combining or separating of 
concepts.11 
Thus, presented with the content or immanent objectivity of “a learned 
man”, which can be represented by the complex name “man who is learned”, 
symbolized as )(/ xLearnedMan , one can either affirm or deny the existence 
of such a man.12 Of course, one might object: how can what is not a 
proposition, specifically an immanent objectivity, be affirmed or denied? 
Brentano’s answer is that we can use the predicate ‘exists’ ( !E ) to express a 
judgment that is an affirmation, and ‘does not exist’ ( !E ) to express a denial; 
thus,  
)(!))(/( xExLearnedxMan  
will represent what it is to affirm the existence of a learned man, and 
)(!))(/( xExLearnedxMan   
to deny the existence of a learned man. Note that the quantifier phrase 
))(/( xLearnedxMan  is read as ‘a man who is learned’ (or equivalently as ‘a 
learned man’) in this context, even though it might be read in a different 
context as ‘some man who is learned’. But in no context is it read as ‘There 
exists a man who is learned’, otherwise it would be contradictory to speak of 
there existing a learned man who does not exist. 
Of course, the above representation of the proposition that a learned man 
does not exist is not logically correct. Rather, the correct way to represent the 
proposition is by having the negation sign up front instead of before the 
existence predicate !E . But that is not how Brentano described his theory of 
denial, which is what we are proposing to represent here. (In any case, we will 
return to the correct way to represent denials, namely with the negation sign up 
front, later in section 4 below.) Meinong, incidentally, would say in this case 
(and in other similar cases noted below) that if the proposition were true, then 
some man who is learned would be a “pure” object that does not exist; but that 
is an interpretation Brentano emphatically rejected. 
 
11 Ibid. Strictly speaking, Brentano speaks of a combining and separating of properties, not of 
concepts. 
12 Ibid., p. 64. 
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In regard to the predicate ‘exists’, Brentano insists that it does not 
represent a property, though it is meaningful to predicate it as just indicated. 
Thus, according to Brentano, when we say ‘ A  exists’, it “ is not the 
conjunction of an attribute ‘existence’ with ‘ A ’, but ‘ A ’ itself which we 
affirm,” and similarly with the denial that A exists (ibid.). Nor does ‘exist’ 
represent a property in conceptualism, incidentally; but it does stand for a 
concept as a cognitive capacity underlying and accounting for our use of this 
predicate in natural language. It is noteworthy, moreover, that what Brentano 
called an immanent objectivity, which is what he claimed accounted for the 
intentionality or directedness and referentiality of a mental act, coincides in 
conceptualism with the exercise of a referential concept, which in 
conceptualism is what accounts for the intentionality of a mental act as well. 
Now according to Brentano every proposition (Satz) is of one of the four 
traditional forms of categorical proposition. Here, by a proposition Brentano 
does not mean the abstract content or meaning of a sentence, the ontology of 
which he emphatically denied altogether along with Meinong’s Objectives. 
Instead, by a proposition he meant only a judgment (a mental act) of one of the 
four categorical forms. Brentano claimed that of the four categorical forms the 
existential form is basic. Indeed, he goes so far in this view as to claim that 
“every categorical proposition can be translated into an existential one without 
any change in meaning”.13 Thus “the categorical proposition ‘Some man is 
sick’ has the same meaning as ‘a sick man exists’” (ibid.), which can be 
symbolized in our conceptualist system as  
),(!))(S/( xExickxMan  
where /( xMan S ))(xick represents the content or immanent object of the 
judgment. “The categorical proposition ‘No stone is living’ has the same 
meaning as the existential proposition, ‘A living stone does not exist’” (ibid.), 
which can be symbolized as 
),(!))(/( xExAlivexStone   
where ))(/( xAlivexStone  represents the content or immanent object of the 
judgment.14 One might also add here the judgment that no square is round, 
 
13 Ibid., p. 66. This is a problematic thesis, as we note below, which in the end must be modified. 
14 Of course, the correct way to symbolize this proposition is by moving the negation up front; but, as 
already noted, we will take up that issue later in our conceptualist account of denial. 
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which can be symbolized as 
),(!))(/( xExRoundxSquare   
where ))(/( xRoundxSquare represents the immanent object of the 
judgment. 
In regard to the universal affirmative, “the categorical proposition ‘All men 
are mortal’ has the same meaning as the existential proposition ‘An immortal 
man does not exist’” (ibid.), which can be symbolized as 
),(!))(/( xExMortalxMan   
where ))(/( xMortalxMan   represents the content or immanent object of 
a man who is not mortal. Finally, “the categorical proposition ‘Some man is not 
learned’ has the same meaning as ... ‘A non-learned man exists’” (ibid.), which 
can be symbolized as 
),(!))(/( xExLearnedxMan   
where ))(/( xLearnedxMan   represents the content or immanent object 
of the judgment. 
The content or immanent object of any one of these judgments is not itself 
an independently existing (or subsisting) object, according to Brentano, and in 
fact in his view nothing “exists for which the word content is a name”.15 Nor 
can such a content subsist or have any other mode of being independently of 
the mental act in which it occurs. There are no independently existing 
intentional objects according to Brentano, but just actual concrete things, 
including the events that make up our mental life. This kind of actualism 
according to which “there cannot be anything at all other than real objects” 
also applies to the properties and relations that “we express in our language by 
means of such abstractions as redness, shape, human nature and the like” 
(Ibid.), where, by human nature, we mean humanity, and by shape we mean 
rectangularity, triangularity, etc. In other words, according to Brentano, there 
are no such abstract objects as properties and relations. 
 
15Brentano 1874c, p. 74. 
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3. Meinongian Objectives 
Meinong agreed that ideal objects such as humanity and triangularity do not 
exist (existieren) and “consequently cannot in any sense be real (wirklich).”16 
But that is because they are ideal (abstract) objects, not real (concrete) objects, 
and ideal objects, according to Meinong, have a mode of being different from 
that of real objects, a mode Meinong called subsistence (Bestand). In other 
words, there are two modes of being in Meinong’s ontology, concrete being 
(existence), and ideal being (subsistence). Numbers, along with properties and 
relations, are also ideal objects. “The form of being (Sein) with which 
mathematics as such is occupied,” according to Meinong, “is never existence 
(Existenz). In this respect, mathematics never transcends subsistence 
(Bestand)”.17 
The presumption that ideal objects subsist, i.e., have being, is part of our 
commonsense understanding of the world as expressed in natural language. 
We have no difficulty or qualms in speaking of wisdom, humanity or 
triangularity, for example. It is a presumption that goes well beyond Brentano’s 
actualism, and it requires a logic and a theory of logical and propositional forms 
that goes well beyond syllogistic and Brentano’s categorical propositions. 
Meinong did not develop such a logic himself, unfortunately, nor did he 
describe a theory of logical forms in which to express his various claims or 
views. As a result, his arguments and major theses can be understood only in 
the informal terms of ordinary language, or in terms of the partial 
reconstructions of his views that have been made by others.18 
Meinong’s ontology also goes beyond Brentano’s in his theory of 
Objectives (Objektiven), a theory that Brentano strongly rejected.19 A 
judgment, according to Meinong, is an ideal ternary relational complex 
consisting of (1) a mental act with (2) a content directed toward (3) an 
Objective, which is something like a state of affairs, but which Meinong 
described as an ideal object. Thus, in regard to Brentano’s account of the 
judgment that a learned man exists, Meinong would say that this judgment is 
true (assuming that it is true) because the Objective toward which it is directed 
has being (Sein), which is to say that it is a fact. And furthermore, one of the 
 
16Meinong, 1904, p.79. 
17 Ibid., p.80. 
18 See, e.g., Parsons 1980 for such a partial reconstruction. 
19Brentano, 1874c, p. 72f. 
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constituents of this fact is a learned man. 
Similarly, the judgment that a round square does not exist is true, according 
to Meinong, because the Objective toward which it is directed has being, and 
hence is a fact with a round square as a constituent. But of course a round 
square does not exist, and in fact it cannot exist, nor even subsist, a point on 
which Meinong agreed. Nevertheless, according to Meinong, “if the Objective 
has being (ist), so in some sense or other, must the object which belongs to it, 
even when the Objective is an Objective of non-being (Nichtseinsobjektiv).”20 
The being of the Objective, in other words, “ is not by any means ... dependent 
upon the being of its Object.” 21 Thus, even though a round square can neither 
exist nor subsist, nevertheless it is a constituent of the Objective that a round 
square does not exist; it is, according to Meinong, a “pure Object” that is 
outside of being (ausserseiend). 
Now just as the judgment that a round square does not exist is true because 
a round square does not exist, i.e., because the Objective of a round square not 
existing has being, and therefore is a fact, so too the judgment that the round 
square is round and square is true because, according to Meinong, the 
Objective of the round square being both round and square (a Soseinobjektiv) 
has being, and therefore is a fact. Yet, that the round square is both round and 
square, Meinong agrees, is impossible. Something impossible, in other words, 
is a fact. 
Similarly, the judgment that the gold mountain is a mountain made of gold 
is true, because the (Soseinobjektiv) Objective toward which it is directed is a 
fact according to Meinong. But such a so-called fact is clearly in conflict with 
our commonsense understanding that a mountain made of gold must exist as a 
concrete object in the physical world, and hence must occupy some part of real 
space-time; and yet in fact there is no such object in the physical world 
occupying any part of space-time (or so we assume). In other words, the gold 
mountain does not exist. Again, Meinong agrees: the gold mountain does not 
exist, but, nevertheless, he insists, it is a mountain made of gold. 
Meinong’s fundamental assumption in these matters is his principle of the 
independence of Sosein (an object’s characteristics) from Sein (the being of 
that object). Thus, being a mountain made of gold, according to Meinong, is a 
property (an ideal object) that is independent of the fact that there does not 
exist a gold mountain, which explains why (does it really?) the (nonexistent) 
 
20Meinong, 1904, p. 84. 
21 Ibid., p. 85. 
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gold mountain is nevertheless made of gold. Meinong also claims that the 
principle of the independence of Sosein from Sein “applies not only to Objects 
which do not in fact exist, but also to Objects which could not exist because 
they are impossible,”22 and hence it explains why (does it really?) the round 
square, which cannot exist, is nevertheless round and square. 
Now, we agree, there are cases in which an object might fall under a 
concept even though the object does not exist. Consider, e.g., the proposition 
that Eve is an ancestor of everyone now existing. If this judgment were true, 
then Eve now falls under the concept of being an ancestor of everyone now 
existing, even though Eve does not now exist. For if not now, then when is she 
an ancestor of everyone now existing? Or consider any one of your ancestors 
whose life-span does not overlap with your own. That ancestor now has the 
characteristic of being your ancestor, even though he or she does not now 
exist. In other words some past objects clearly have characteristics now, or 
rather now fall under concepts, even though they do not now exist. But those 
concepts or characteristics, it should be noted, do not entail existence (now). 
That is, unlike (now) being a mountain or (now) being made of gold, being 
your ancestor (now) is not an existence-entailing concept or characteristic, a 
concept or characteristic that we generally call an e-concept or an e-property.23 
In other words, the Sosein of (now) being your ancestor does not depend on 
the Sein, or existence (now), of most of your ancestors. But the truth of this 
kind of fact does not in any way explain the independence of the Sosein of 
being a mountain made of gold from the Sein, or existence, of such a mountain. 
Meinong’s additional application of his principle, namely his claim that 
even impossible objects can have properties, is even more contrary to our 
commonsense understanding than when applied to just factually nonexistent 
objects such as the gold mountain. Being round and being square apply 
separately either to a figure in physical space or to a figure in a mathematically 
ideal space, and hence entail having being either in the form of physical 
existence or in the form of subsistence. But in neither case can it be both round 
and square. 
Meinong in fact agrees that neither mode of being applies, but only because 
the round square is “a pure object beyond being and non-being,” i.e., the 
round square is “outside of being” (ausserseiend), and yet nevertheless “at 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 For a development of the logic of e-concepts or e-properties and e-relations, see Cocchiarella 
1969a, or Cocchiarella 1969b for a more informal account. 
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least one of its two Objectives of being, the Object’s being or non-being, 
subsists.”24 
Clearly, the idea of an Objective in Meinong’s ontology is something very 
much like that of a state of affairs, which is an extensional entity, so that if 
either it or its complement is the case (subsists), i.e., is a fact, then its 
constituent object(s) must have being. An Objective, accordingly, goes well 
beyond the ontological commitments of states of affairs. 
A clearer and more intuitively acceptable idea would have been that an 
Objective is a proposition in the sense of an abstract intensional entity as 
opposed to an extensional entity such as a state of affairs; and instead of having 
the round square as “a pure Object” standing outside of being as a constituent, 
we would then have only the intension of the phrase ‘the round square’ as a 
functional part of the proposition. But then the intension of ‘the round square’ 
is neither round nor square, nor would the intension of ‘the gold mountain’ be 
a mountain made of gold—unless, of course, we are talking only about the 
round square or the gold mountain in some particular intensional context, such 
as the propositions that make up a myth or a story, or those in someone’s mind 
in the sense of what they think, desire, imagine, believe, etc. We will describe 
just such an alternative below. 
4. Conceptual Realism and Intensional Objects 
The conceptualist logic of names that we briefly described earlier (in section 1) 
and that we used in the representation of Brentano’s actualist theory of 
judgment is extended in a significant way in the logic of conceptual realism (as 
opposed to that of conceptualism simpliciter). In particular the logic is 
extended so as to allow predicates to be nominalized and to occur as abstract 
singular terms, which is the formal counterpart of the realist ontological view 
that Brentano rejected and Meinong accepted about such ideal objects as 
humanity and triangularity (and which is why the framework is called 
conceptual realism). Of course, these abstract singular terms do not, and 
indeed cannot, denote the concepts that predicates stand for in their role as 
predicates, because the latter are unsaturated cognitive capacities, and hence 
cannot be taken as objects. Nevertheless, most, but not all, of these 
nominalized predicates can be consistently assumed to have a denotation in the 
logic of conceptual realism; and, moreover, what they can be assumed to 
 
24 Op. cit., p. 86. 
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denote are the “object”-fied intensional contents of the concepts that the 
predicates stand for in their role as predicates, contents that we take to be the 
truth conditions determined by those concepts through all possible contexts of 
use.25 These intensional objects are not mental objects, it should be 
emphasized; rather, they are the semantic contents of our predicable concepts 
projected into the domain of objects. The projection occurs as a result of the 
inveterate human practice of trying to speak of (or make into) an object what is 
not an object, specifically the cultural and linguistically institutionalized 
practice of nominalization. 
Thus in addition to the concept that the predicate phrase ‘is human’ stands 
for we have humanity, an abstract object, as the intensional content of that 
concept, and similarly, instead of the concepts that ‘is wise’ and ‘is triangular’ 
stand for we have wisdom and triangularity as the “object”-fied intensional 
content of those concepts. Traditionally, these intensional objects have been 
called properties and relations (in intension), a practice we have adopted 
ourselves, but with the cautionary note that these properties and relations are 
objects and as such do not have a predicative nature in the sense that concepts 
do.26 In any case, it is in terms of these properties and relations that the 
intentional objects of ordinary discourse are represented in conceptual 
realism. These intensional objects (properties and relations) do not exist as 
concrete objects, of course, but they do have being (as values of the bound 
object variables), or as Meinong would say, they subsist as ideal objects. The 
resulting logic, as has been noted and proved elsewhere, is consistent and 
equivalent to the theory of simple types. 
The complex predicate expressions of natural language are represented in 
this logic by  -abstracts, which can be read as infinitival phrases when they 
occur as abstract singular terms. A relational property, such as to be an x such 
that x stands in a relation R to an A , can then be symbolized as 
)],()([ yxRyAx  . In particular, to slay a dragon can be symbolized  
)].,()([ yxSlaysyDragonx   
Such a phrase can occur in our extended logic as an object term, as in the 
 
25 Because of Russell’s paradox, some nominalized predicates must fail to denote in this logic. See 
Cocchiarella 1987 for details. 
26 Nor do they have a predicative nature in physical reality the way that natural (causal) properties and 
relations do. For more on this see Cocchiarella 2012. 
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statement that young Giorgio wants to slay a dragon, which we can represent as 
follows:27 
)]).,()([,()( yxSlaysyDragonxzWantszGiorgio    
Of course there are no dragons, but that does not mean that we cannot 
represent Giorgio’s mental state of desire. Note that although the predicate 
Wants  entails existence in its first-argument position, it does not entail 
existence in its second-argument position, which of course is generally true of 
intensional verbs. The second-argument position of Wants  is like a form of 
indirect discourse, and as such is referentially opaque. In particular, one 
cannot infer from the above statement that there is a dragon that Giorgio wants 
to slay. But that, of course, is exactly what Meinong would allow in his theory of 
objects. In this regard our logic is more in agreement with Brentano than with 
Meinong. 
But, as noted earlier, we are also not in agreement with Brentano in his 
representation of the denial of a judgment, as, e.g., in the denial that a round 
square exists. In Brentano’s version the denial is represented by a negation of 
the predicate ‘exists’, as in:  
).(!))(/( xExRoundxSquare   
But this is misleading in that it suggests that we are referring to a round square 
and saying of it that it does not exist, which is exactly how Meinong would 
interpret the judgment. In conceptualism, however, the denial is represented 
by placing the negation in front, as in  
).(!))(/( xExRoundxSquare  
The idea is that the negation in front is really like a predicate, say Neg , read 
as ‘(it) is not the case’, with what follows it as its argument, which in this case is 
the nominalized sentence ‘that a round square exists’. The denial is then more 
properly read as ‘That a round square exists is not the case’. The nominalized 
sentence denotes neither a state of affairs nor an Objective. Rather, what is 
denoted is the proposition that is being denied, and the constituents of that 
 
27 When a sentence or a predicate expression is nominalized in a given context we say that its assertive 
or predicative role is “deactivated” in that context, and that all of the referential expressions that occur 
in that sentence or predicate are then understood to be deactivated as well. For more on this notion 
deactivation see Cocchiarella 2007, chapters 7 and 9. 
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proposition are intensional objects, not “pure objects” outside of being 
(ausserseiend). The upshot is that in denying that a round square exists we are 
not referring to a round square. The same is true of denying in general, e.g., in 
denying that there is a living stone we are not referring to a living stone. In a 
denial, reference is deactivated. 
The question now is how are intentional (with a t) objects to be represented 
in the logic of conceptual realism? How, in particular, are the objects that do 
not exist outside of the mind or a fiction, e.g., things such as unicorns, 
dragons, and even round squares to be represented? Let us be clear here: 
being a dragon and being a unicorn are e-concepts (or e-properties) so that if 
anything were a dragon or a unicorn, then it would exist.28 It is only as an 
intentional object in someone’s mind or as a fictional object in a story that one 
can speak of a dragon or of a unicorn as having the properties ascribed to them. 
In regard to the representation of intentional (with a t) objects, our 
fundamental thesis is that such objects are to be represented in conceptual 
realism by intensional (with an s) objects, i.e., by the abstract objects denoted 
by nominalized predicates. Note in this regard that even a quantifier phrase 
such as ‘a dragon’ can be nominalized in conceptual realism. We do so by first 
transforming a quantifier phrase )(QxA  into a complex predicate (but retain 
the indexing variable), a transformation that can be schematically defined as 
follows:29 
)],()([=][ xFQxAFQxA df   
whichs stands for a concept under which properties fall, or, when nominalized, 
a property of properties. Then, we simply nominalize the resulting complex 
predicate.30 Thus, e.g., the quantifier phrase ‘a dragon’, can be transformed 
into the complex predicate 
 
28 In their role as predicates in our speech and mental acts, the predicates ‘is a unicorn’ and ‘is a 
dragon’ stand for e-concepts, whereas their nominalized intensional contents, being (or to be) a 
unicorn and being (or to be) a dragon, are e-properties. 
29 Strictly speaking, the  -abstract in this definition schema is short for 
)]()(=)(([ xFQxAFzFz  . Note also that we use brackets instead of parentheses 
for the transformed expression. 
30 When a predicate expression is nominalized we drop the parentheses that accompany it in its role as 
a predicate. We also do this when talking about the predicate as a predicate simpliciter. 
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)],()([ yFyDragonF   
which can then be nominalized and taken as denoting the intension of the 
phrase. This particular intension is a property under which a property falls if, 
and only if, it is a property of a dragon. 
Similarly, the intension of the quantifier phrase ‘the dragon that Giorgio 
wants to slay’ is defined as 
)],())]),([,()/(([ 1 yFyzzSlaysxWantsxGiorgioyDragonF    
which, by the above schema, is a concept (or property when nominalized) 
under which a property falls if, and only if, it is a property of the dragon Giorgio 
wants to slay. Of course, there are no dragons, which means that as it stands 
this is a vacuous concept. The same observation applies to the quantifier 
phrase ‘the round square’, the intension of which is 
)]()/([ 1 xFroundxSquareF  , which is also a vacuous concept (or 
property) of properties. But still these are meaningful expressions and can be 
used both in fiction and in an intensional context such as in a description of 
Giorgio’s desire to slay a dragon. Such an intension will then not be vacuous 
once it is relativized to a fictional or intensional context. 
Consider, e.g., the story Romeo and Juliet in Flatland that we described in 
an earlier paper. In this story, which occurs in a two-dimensional space called 
Flatland, Juliet, who is a Capulet, is a circle, and Romeo, who is a Montague, is 
a square. Romeo and Juliet fall in love, despite a feud between their families, 
and they secretly have an affair (Cocchiarella 1996) Juliet gets pregnant and in 
time gives birth to a round square. The families discover the affair and think of 
the infant as a monster. They then have the infant murdered and keep its birth, 
death and the whole affair between Romeo and Juliet a secret. In despair, 
Romeo and Juliet commit suicide. (The end!) The point to note about this 
story is that in it the round square has not only the property of being round and 
square, but also the property of having Juliet as a mother and Romeo as a 
father; and it also has the property, among others, of being murdered by its 
grandparents. 
Using the two-place predicate In  to represent the relation between a story 
such as Romeo and Juliet in Flatland, which we will abbreviate by JR& , and 
the propositions expressed in the story, we can express the proposition that the 
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round square (of the story) is round as follows31: 
)]).())(/[(,&( 1 xRoundxRoundxSquareJRIn   
The round square of the story is of course just a character in the story, and as 
such it is really just an intensional object (along with the other characters of the 











In other words, as an intensional object, the round square of the story JR&  
is the property of those properties that the round square has in the story. In 
particular, the round square of the story has the property of being round, which 
we can express as: 
).()](/[ &1 RoundxRoundxSquare JR  
We can also represent this another way in the logic of conceptual realism by 
transforming an object expression, say x , into a predicate expression x , 
defined as the property of being a property of x  as follows: 
)].([= xFFx df 
  
Then we have not only )()( FxxF   as provable in our logic, but also 
)()(  xFxF , and so on with the *-operation iterated indefinitely. In any 
case, the above statement that the property of being round is a property of the 
round square of the story JR& , can now also be expressed as: 
).)](/([ &1 JRxRoundxSquareRound 
  
It is not just the intensional objects of fiction that we can represent in this way, 
of course, but also the intentional objects of our mental states. Thus, consider 
the sentence ‘Alexius thinks that the round square is round’, which we can 
symbolize as: 
)]).()/[(,()( 1 xRoundroundxSquareyThinksyAlexius   
 
31 We place brackets around a sentence to transform it (by nominalization) into an object term naming 
the proposition expressed by the sentence. 
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where the bracketed object term )]()/[( 1 xRoundRoundxSquare  
represents the nominalized sentence ‘that the round square is round’. In this 
context, the intensional object )](/[ 1 xRoundxSquare  is not vacuous in 
Alexius’s mind if Alexius in fact thinks that the round square is round.32 Let us 
assume, accordingly, that we can represent what is in Alexius’s mind in the 
same way that we represent the content of a story. Then, using mAlexius  (or 
using mx  for a variable x ) to represent Alexius’s (or x ’s) mind, we can 
symbolize the fact that in his mind the round square is round as follows: 
)]),()/[(,( 1 xRoundRoundxSquareAlexiusIn
m   
or equally 
)]).()/[(,()( 1 xRoundRoundxSquarexInxAlexius
m   
We can then go on to characterize the round square that is in Alexius’s mind as 
an intensional object in the same way that we characterized the round square of 
the story JR& :  
dfmAlexius
xRoundxSquare =)](/[ 1  
)])].()/[(,()([ 1 xFRoundxSquarexInxAlexiusF
m   
In other words, the intensional (with an s) object,  
,])(/[ 1 mAlexius
xRoundxSquare  
now represents the intentional (with a t) object that is in Alexius’s mind. This 
intensional object, of course, is not vacuous, because it has the property of 
being (a property of the property) round: 
),(])(/[ 1 RoundxRoundxSquare mAlexius
  
which, as already noted, we can also express as saying that it has the property of 
being Round simpliciter: 
 
32 We are not engaged in a phenomenological description of Alexius’s mind here. Nothing more 
esoteric is meant by speaking of a proposition as being “ in” a person’s mind other than that the 
person either thinks, believes, imagines, etc., the proposition in question. 
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).])(/([ 1 mAlexius
xRoundxSquareRound   
The same kind of analysis applies to young Giorgio’s mental state of wanting to 
slay a dragon. Here, the quantifier phrase ‘the dragon Giorgio wants to slay’ 
must be relativized to what is in Giorgio’s mind:  
dfmGiorgio
yzzSlaysxWantsxGiorgioyDragon =)])],([,()/([ 1   
.])](])),([,(/[(,()([ 1 xFyzzSlaysxWantsyDragonxInxGiorgioF
m  
 It follows accordingly that if Giorgio thinks of the dragon as a fire-breathing 
creature with scales and very large teeth, then these are properties of the 
dragon in Giorgio’s mind that he wants to slay, which is to say that this 
intensional object is not vacuous, unlike the intensional object described 
above, i.e., the intension of ‘the dragon Giorgio wants to slay’ when it is not 
relativized to Giorgio’s mind. 
5. Intensional Objects Between Minds 
A more difficult, but perhaps, more interesting example to explain is the 
double intentionality of Jack and Jill in the sentence: 
buy.  toplans Jill house  theis build  toplansJack  house The  
The most obvious, but wrong, analysis of this sentence is to read it as a simple 
identity between two definite descriptions:33 
                     xHou1( s )])),([,()/( xzzBuildsyPlansyJacke   
wHou1( s zBuyPlansyJille [,()/( y ),=)]))(,( wxwzs  
where )],([ xzBuildsz  is read as ‘to be a z such that z builds x ’, and 
Buz[ y )],( wzs  is read as ‘to be a z such that z buys w ’. The problem 
with this analysis is that the house in question does not exist at the time when 
Jack plans to build it, and therefore the house does not yet exist at the time that 
 
33 The two following lines should be read as a single formula. It might help in reading this formula if we 
illustrate its structure in terms of the less complex and more schematic statement, ‘The A  is 
(identical with) the B ’. We symbolize this more schematic statement as: 
 ).=)()(( 11 yxyBxA   
20  Humana.Mente – Issue 25 – December 2013 
Jill plans to buy it. In other words, in order for these definite descriptions not 
to be vacuous—i.e., in order for them to in fact denote a real house—then the 
house must exist before it is built and sold, which of course is impossible. 
Something cannot be a house unless it exists, because being a house is an e-
concept or e-property. A house does not exist if it does not occupy a region of 
space and time and as such is part of the physical world. Of course Meinong 
would simply posit the “pure being” of such a house regardless of its 
nonexistence; but that is where we will not follow him. 
Now a different answer can be found in terms of intensional objects. The 
most natural way to proceed is first to intensionally identify the house that is in 
Jack’s mind, and then to intensionally identify the house that is in Jill’s mind. 
We do so in accordance with our earlier procedure. Accordingly, the house 
that is in Jack’s mind can be defined as follows: 
xHou1[ s dfmJackxzzBuildsyPlansyJacke =)])],([,()/(   
xHousyInyJackF m 1[(,()([  )])],()]),([,(/ xFxzzBuildsyPlanse   
and the house that is in Jill’s mind can be similarly defined as: 
xHou1[ s zBuyPlansyJille [,()/( y dfmJillxz =)])],(  
xHouyInyJillF m 1[(,()([  s zBuyPlanse [,(/ y )])].()]),( xFxz  
The final move is to identify the house that is in Jack’s mind with the house that 
is in Jill’s mind. This is true because the properties of the house that Jack plans 
to build are the properties of the house that Jill plans to buy if in fact it is true 
that the house that Jack plans to build is the house that Jill plans to buy. Here it 
is important to keep in mind that we are identifying objectively real intensional 
(with an s) objects, not intentionally (with a t) inexistent immanent objects that 
are parts of Jack’s and Jill’s minds. 
6. Existence 
We have noted that some of the (monadic) predicates of natural language entail 
existence whereas others do not. Also, some of the relational predicates of 
natural language entail existence in one or more of their argument positions 
but not in others. Intensional verbs in particular entail (as most verbs do) 
existence in their first (or subject) argument position but not in their second 
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(direct object) position. Consider, e.g., ‘worship’, as in ‘Janet worships a god 
who lives on Oylmpus’, or ‘seek’ as in ‘Giorgio seeks a fire-breathing dragon’. 
Here ‘worship’ and ‘seek’ entail existence in their first (subject) argument 
positions but not in their second (direct object) positions. 
This distinction is a feature that is fundamental to all natural languages, and 
it clearly has much to do with how we experience the world. Color predicates, 
e.g., ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘blue’, etc., as well as the predicates that describe our 
various sensory experiences are e-predicates, and of course so are the 
predicates for all of the different animals and plants and our various artifacts. 
The distinction between e-concepts, or e-properties, and concepts or 
properties in general can be used, as we have noted elsewhere, as a basis for 
explaining Meinong’s distinction between konstitutorisch (also called 
‘nuclear’) and ausserkonstitutorisch (also called ‘extranuclear’)properties.34 
With existence as a primitive concept (as we assumed in the logic of names), we 
can contextually define quantification over e-concepts as follows: 
),)](!)()[()((=)(   xExFxFF df
e   
).)](!)()[()((=)(   xExFxFF df
e   
In conceptual realism, however, because the distinction between existence-
entailing predicates and non-existence-entailing predicates is such a 
fundamental feature of natural language and our conceptual development both 
collectively and as individuals, we prefer to take quantification over e-concepts 
(or e-properties) as primitive. Existence would then be defined as falling under 
an e-concept, which means that existence, which of course is itself an e-
concept, is an impredicative concept, i.e., a concept definable in terms of a 
totality to which it belongs. To exist, i.e., to fall under an existence-entailing 
concept, is defined as follows: 
).()(=)(! xFFxE edf   
This approach explains why existence is so different from most of the e-
concepts that are expressed by the predicates of natural language. It perhaps 
also helps explain why Meinong viewed existence as an ausserkonstitutorisch 
property, but it does not explain why he distinguished being existent from existence. 
 
34 For details on this see Cocchiarella 1982. The terminology of ‘nuclear’ and ‘extranuclear’ is from 
Parsons 1980. 
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Needless to say, we reject Meinong’s attempt to distinguish existence from 
being existent. On our account of attributive adjectives, to be an existent 
object is to be an object that exists (which in any case is how the dictionary 
describes the attributive adjective ‘existent’). In regard to Meinong’s 
distinction between konstitutorisch and ausserkonstitutorisch properties, we 
would associate e-concepts (or e-properties) with properties that are 
konstitutorisch, and concepts (or properties) in general, whether existence 
entailing or not, with properties that are ausserkonstitutorisch. The so-called 
“watered-down” version of an ausserkonstitutorisch property F , which upon 
being “watered down” becomes a konstitutorisch property according to 
Meinong, would then be represented by the restriction of F to existent 
objects, or formally: ))](!)(([ xExFx  , which of course is an e-concept or 
e-property even if F  is not. 
We can go on to construct a rather simple model of Meinongian objects in 
terms of classes of e-properties.35 We might note in this regard that existent 
objects that fall under the same e-concepts are identical: 
),=)]()()[)(()(( yxyFxFFyx eee   
which means that we can correlate one-to-one each existing object x  with the 
class of e-properties of x . In this way we can distinguish the Meinongian 
objects that exist from the Meinongian objects that do not exist. That is, other 
classes of e-properties would represent nonexisting Meinongian objects. The 
impossible Meinongian object of being round and square can be represented, 
for example, in terms of the class of e-properties having just roundness and 
squareness as members. There will of course be other classes of e-properties 
that contain roundness and squareness, e.g., classes with various color 
properties, and they might also be called Meinongian blue, or red. etc., round 
squares, but they will not be the Meinongian round square. The Meinongian 
gold mountain can be represented by the class of e-properties having just 
mountainhood and being made of gold as its members. A variety of other 
Meinongian distinctions can also be represented in this kind of model, of 
 
35 Actually these would be the classes as many or pluralities that are part of the logic of conceptual 
realism once the names, proper or common and complex or simple, that occur as parts of quantifier 
phrases are also nominalized, i.e., transformed into object terms. For a description of the logic of 
classes as many and its application to mass noun reference and predication as well as plural reference 
and predication, see Cocchiarella 2007 and 2009. 
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course, but we will forego those details here, except perhaps to note that (by 
definition) the Meinongian objects in this model that have the same e-
properties (as members) are identical, a result that corresponds to Meinong’s 
principle that objects that have the same konstitutorisch properties are 
identical. 
This kind of model allows us to understand (or rather represent) certain 
aspects of Meinong’s ontology without accepting the inconsistencies and 
conceptual difficulties that arise in a direct presentation of that ontology. We 
do not believe, however, that such a model means that Meinong’s ontology can 
be accepted as a coherent ontology. In any case, as we have indicated, we do 
not need to resort to a Meinongian ontology in order to account for the 
intentional objects of our mental states any more than we do to account for the 
intensional objects of myth and fiction. 
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